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Abstract 
Mobile Ad hoc networks are often used in places with little or no infrastructure. However 
its very nature of being dynamic and infrastructure less makes it vulnerable to many of 
the security related issues. In this paper we make use of the vulnerability present in the 
AODV protocol to present a new kind of Man in the Middle attack for MANETs namely, 
“The Paris Attack”. 
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Introduction  
A mobile Ad hoc network (MANET) is a network formed by a collection of nodes that 
are free to move around (mobile), leave and join the network at their wish. This kind of a 
network is beneficiary at places where building up an infrastructure is not feasible. Due 
to this lack of proper infrastructure and dynamic nature of MANETs it is prone to many 
security issues.  
AODV [2] is one of the main routing protocols that are currently being used. Since 
AODV is a reactive protocol, whenever a node is ready to make a data transmission (say 
source node S) to any other node (say Destination node D) it starts the route discovery 
process. This is done by broadcasting a Route Request Packet (RREQ) to all of its 
neighbors. These packets are further transmitted to its neighbors and so on, until a node is 
found which has a fresh enough route to the Destination node (D) or the Destination node 
itself. In the either case the node replies back with a Route Response (RREP) to the node 
from which it received the RREQ. This RREP is further transmitted in the reverse 
direction till it reaches the Source node (S). The intermediate nodes update their routing 
tables whenever they receive an RREQ or an RREP packet with the next hop 
information. 
Once the RREP packet reaches the Source node (S) it starts routing the data packets to 
the node from which it first received the RREP. This is because it is usually the shortest 
path. The packet is further passed on according to the next hop information of the 
intermediate nodes till it reaches the Destination node. Some researchers [3-11] discuss 
the vulnerabilities in Ad hoc routing protocols and the attacks that can be launched. The 
AODV protocol is vulnerable to many of the attacks. Some of them are The Black Hole 
  Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011 
        ISSN 1839-6518  82800101201102 
www.irj.iars.info  Page 4 
attack [3], Gray Hole Attack [6, 7], Rushing Attack [11], Worm Hole Attack [8-10] etc.  
A Black hole is a node that always answers positively for a Route Request (RREQ) even 
though it does not necessarily have a route. However once the data packets are routed 
through this node, it silently drops all the packets. A Black hole usually has a high 
probability of being chosen as a route because of two reasons:  It doesn’t have to check 
its routing table each time a RREQ is made to it. This reduces the computation time for 
the RREQ packet. It answers positively for every route request. On the other hand a Gray 
Hole is a node which behaves as normal node till a certain point of time but turns 
malicious later on. Also a Gray hole does not necessarily drop all the data packets, as in 
the case of a Black Hole. It may be selective towards specific nodes or specific kind of 
packets. Hence it is much more difficult to detect a Gray Hole in comparison to a Black 
Hole.  
In this paper we present a new kind of attack for an ad hoc network that has the chances 
of being chosen as a valid route as high as that of a Black Hole & the stealth in the 
network much more than that of a Gray hole. The primary motive of the paper is to 
present a mechanism to intercept all the local network traffic around the malicious node 
without being detected. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
survey the related work. In section 3 the network model is given. In section 4, the 
proposed Methodology for the Attack is given. Finally in Section 5 we conclude and 
discuss future work. 
Related Work 
Recent researches have proposed many edible solutions to the above mentioned attacks. 
Many other attacks have also been proposed such as the Worm Hole Attack, the Rushing 
Attack, etc. Some of them have been briefed up below. 
As explained earlier Juan [3] proposed the black hole injection attack in AODV 
according to which the malicious node replies positively for every RREP and hence gets 
into the route. It then silently drops all the data packets to be forwarded .Deng [4] has 
proposed an algorithm to prevent black hole attacks in ad hoc networks. Further S. 
Ramaswamy [5] proposed a solution to counter even the co-operative black hole attack. 
Since then many other solutions [4-7] have also been proposed. In case of a gray hole 
attack [6], it is a variation of the black hole, in which the nodes are initially not malicious 
but turns malicious later on. Also in such an attack the gray node may selectively drop 
data packets which make it further difficult to detect it. In order to counter this attack 
S.Banerjee [6] proposed that the total data traffic be divided into small sized blocks and 
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then perform an end to end checking. Many others [6-7] have also proposed various 
solutions. 
In case of a wormhole attack [10], a node selectively transfers the packets that have 
routing information from one side of the network onto the other side by using a link. This 
shields the nodes near by the attackers from using any other alternative routes that has 
more than one or two hops. Hence making sure all the packets are routed through this 
link. Once, this tunnel is chosen for data transmission the attackers can drop/modify the 
data packets, selectively. A few solutions [8-10] have been proposed to counter 
wormholes as well. 
And then there is the rushing attack [11] where an intermediate node rushes the 
forwarding of RREQ without updating its own routing table. This way it increases its 
chance of being chosen as a possible route. Once the communication link is established 
through this malicious node, it may behave similar to a worm hole by 
dropping/modifying data packets. In order to defeat the rushing attack many solutions 
have been proposed. One such solution proposed by Hu [11] randomizes and delays the 
forwarding of RREQ packets so that an RREQ rushing attacker cannot dominate other 
members during the RREQ phase. 
Further there is the Check Sum Tamper attack [14] and the Port Change attack [13] 
where an intermediate node alters specific fields of the data packets that are being routed 
through it in a way that makes this data corruption stealthy and difficult to detect. The 
data corruption gives an overall effect of the data packets being dropped, however 
physically there is no packet dropping. 
Network Model 
We assume that the network nodes are randomly deployed across the network. We also 
assume that communication is based on an on-demand routing protocol such as AODV. 
Methodology 
Our proposed attack mechanism is a variation of the Black Hole Attack. The major 
difference being that, in a Black Hole attack, the malicious node necessarily drops all the 
data packets that are being routed through it and does not have any valid route to the 
destination. But in our proposal the intention of the attack is to make the malicious node 
an intermediate node. This attack can be used to further pile up other attacks in MANETs 
such as the Port Change Attack [13] or the Check Sum Tamper Attack [14].  
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The attack approach proposed in this paper structures in three successive stages “Figure 
1”: 
 STEP1: When the source node S wants to route the data packets to the destination 
D, it floods the network with RREQ packets “Figure 2”. This is a common step in 
the functioning of any reactive protocol (such as AODV) as explained in Section 
1. Whenever the node needs to route a packet it finds the route to its destination 
by flooding the RREQ and expects a RREP soon. The first node to reply with a 
RREP is chosen as the shortest route and the data is routed through it. 
 STEP2: The malicious node (P) answers positively for every RREQ message it 
encounters with a RREP “Figure 3”. Note that the malicious node (P) doesn't have 
to look into its Routing table to reply with a RREP packet which saves the RREQ 
processing time. This move is the same as that of a Black Hole Attack. However 
the difference is observed because of Step 3.  
 STEP3: The malicious node simultaneously finds a valid route itself to each of 
the victim node's destination (this is where the attack differs), by itself 
broadcasting a RREQ packet in search of a route to the destination node “Fig3”, 
“Fig4”.This RREQ is flooded to all other neighboring nodes except the one from 
which it received the earlier RREQ. This way the attacker has a valid route of 
each of the nodes it acts as an Intermediate Node “Figure 5”. 
Since in Step 2 the attacking node (P), doesn't have to check its routing table, it is usually 
the first to respond to the RREQ in most cases and gets chosen as one of the routing 
nodes. Hence the motive of this attack, which is to intercept all of the local network 
traffic, is fulfilled. 
The advantage of the extra link established is that the malicious node doesn't necessarily 
have to drop the intercepted data packets. Instead the node can corrupt the data packets 
by altering the data. This node would then be like the gateway to all the other local nodes. 
Hence Paris Attack can act as a precursor or a 1
st
 stage to inject a malicious data 
intercepting node of any other Man in the Middle (MITM) attack [13, 14] above it. 
Another option is for the node to choose to be a silent Sniffer as in the case of a hacker 
which also may prove fatal to the Network Security. 
It must be mentioned here that P can carry out other different types of attack by simply 
changing the way it manipulates the intercepted packets. The extra link also makes the 
detection mechanism more difficult. This will be more evident after the discussion below 
on detection strategies of other attacks. 
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Now here is why this attack proposal stands distinct. None of the detection methods used 
to detect a Black Hole, Gray Hole or a Worm Hole can be used to detect the Paris Attack.  
In a traditional Black Hole attack the data packets are plainly dropped and hence the 
detection is easier. Let's look into some of the Black Hole detection methods and see why 
they don't apply here.  
Deng et al [4] initially proposed an algorithm to prevent Black Holes. According to their 
algorithm any node receiving a RREP from an intermediate node crosschecks with the 
next hop on the route if it has a link to the node that sent the RREP and if it also has a 
link to the Destination node. Now in case of a Black Hole it gets caught as there isn't any 
valid route but in our proposed attack since a valid route and the link does exist, this 
detection algorithm would fail. 
Later on S. Ramaswamy [5] extended the above detection method by intensive cross 
checking to solve co-operative Black Holes too. But since the basic idea of cross 
checking is the same, even this detection method would fail.  
Then S. Banerjee [6] proposed an algorithm for detection of Black/Gray holes. The main 
idea being the flow of traffic was monitored by the neighbors of each node. However as 
we see in our attack as long as there is no explicit packet dropping the traffic flow is 
maintained and the attack can't be detected. 
Further Marti [1] proposed the watchdog/pathrater algorithm in which every node has a 
watchdog which listens to the node's packet forwarding promiscuously. In case any of the 
nodes starts dropping the packet above a threshold, the watchdog accuses it to be 
malicious. Once again in this algorithm the watchdog can detect the malicious node only 
if there is a packet drop.  
Gonzalez [12] also uses a similar concept in which the principal idea is the conservation 
of flow, meaning all packets sent to a node and not destined to that node are expected to 
exit the node. This is not violated in the Paris Attack and hence safe from detection. 
Hence as we see most of the algorithms designed to detect other malicious attacks 
wouldn't suffice in detecting this attack. This makes Paris Attack stealthier than any other 
know attacks.  
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we have fully presented the methodology of a new kind of attack in an ad 
hoc network. As future work we hope to  
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 Develop simulations to analyze the performance of the above attack. 
 Develop an efficient solution to the above proposed attack. 
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Figure 2: RREQ Flooding by Source Node. 
 
 
Figure 3: RREP by Attacker + RREQ in 
search of a valid route to D. 
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Figure 4: RREP by D to the Attacker P. 
 
 
Figure 5: Final route from S to D 
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